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Vecinos para el Bienestar de la Comunidad Costera v. FERC, 6 F.4th
1321 (D.C. Cir. 2021)
Malcolm M. Gilbert*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2019, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”)
issued Certificate Orders approving project proposals for three liquefied
natural gas (“LNG”) export terminals and two natural gas pipelines to
supply one terminal (collectively, “Projects”).1 If constructed, all of the
terminals would be situated along a shipping channel near Brownsville,
TX, where the median income is roughly half the national average, and
93-percent of the population identifies as Hispanic or Latinx.2 The two
parallel pipelines would bisect four Texas counties over their 135-mile
course before reaching Brownsville.3 In Vecinos para el Bienestar de la
Comunidad Costera ("Vecinos") Vecinos para el Bienestar de la
Comunidad (“Petitioners”) challenged the Orders, arguing ozone pollution
from the Projects would disproportionately affect lower-income, minority
individuals in Brownsville-area environmental justice communities. 4
Further, Petitioners argued the approval orders did not adequately
rationalize the exclusion of a social cost of carbon tool from FERC’s
environmental impact statements (“EISs”), especially considering their
projection that the construction, operations, and export activity from the

*Malcolm Gilbert, Juris Doctor Candidate 2023, Alexander Blewett III
School of Law at the University of Montana
1.
Order Granting Authorization Under Section 3 of the Natural Gas
Act, 169 FERC ¶ 61, 130 (2019); Order Granting Authorizations Under Sections 3
and 7 of the Natural Gas Act, 169 FERC ¶ 61, 131 (2019); Order Granting
Authorization Under Section 3 of the Natural Gas Act, 169 FERC ¶ 61, 132 (2019)
(Hereinafter “FERC Orders”) (Certificate applications for the export terminals were
submitted by Rio Grande LNG, LLC (“Rio Grande”); Texas LNG, LLC (“Texas
LNG”); and Annova, LLC (“Annova”). Applications for the two natural gas pipelines
were submitted by a Rio Grande subsidiary, Rio Bravo Co. (“Rio Bravo”). Before oral
arguments, intervenor Annova notified FERC they were abandoning their terminal
project, and the Court granted permission to withdraw from court proceedings); see
also, 15 U.S.C. § 717(f)(c) (2018) (requiring any natural gas developer to obtain a
Certificate of Public Convenience or Necessity (“Certificate Order”) from FERC prior
to development in order to demonstrate why the project is in the “public interest”).
2.
U.S. Census Bureau, Brownsville City, Texas, QUICKFACTS,
https://perma.cc/BY87-NFPY (last updated July 1, 2019).
3.
Sierra Club Lone Star Chapter, Rio Bravo Pipeline, LOWER RIO
GRANDE VALLEY GROUP, https://perma.cc/V2VL-8HGP (last visited Sept. 10, 2021).
4.
6 F.4th 1321, 1327 (D.C. Cir. 2021).
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Projects would emit a significant amount of greenhouse gases and
contribute to anthropogenic climate change.5
This case note will explore the role that environmental justice and
climate change play in Federal agency decision-making processes, analyze
the legal framework for the Vecinos decision, and discuss how the
outcome of this litigation could affect similar project proposals in future
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission decisions.
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Petitioners are residents of Laguna Heights, TX, who are
concerned that increased shipping traffic in the Brownsville Shipping
Channel will have disruptive economic effects and negative health impacts
on area residents.6 The local economy depends on tourism and commercial
fishing, which residents fear will be disrupted by gas tankers.7 By contrast,
the Projects’ developers contend they will bring thousands of direct and
indirect jobs to the area, where the unemployment rate is higher than the
national average, at 6.5-percent. 8 Texas LNG and RioGrande LNG
(“Developers”) anticipate processing roughly five billion cubic feet of
LNG per day.9 Over the course of a year, production at their facilities
would amount to approximately 0.7-percent of the 700 billion cubic feet
of LNG the U.S. exported to the global market in 2020.10
In November 2019, Petitioners filed two separate rehearing
requests to address deficiencies with the Orders under the National
Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”).11 They alleged the Projects are not
5.
Br. Resp’t FERC 34, Vecinos para el Bienestar de la Comunidad
Costera v. FERC, 6 F.4th 1321 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (Nos. 20-1093–94 (consolidated));
see also, Christina Swanson, Amanda Levin, Sailing to Nowhere: Liquefied Natural
Gas Is Not An Effective Climate Strategy, Natural Resources Defense Council
(December 2020), https://perma.cc/5NYG-J2VZ (explaining that greenhouse gas
emissions from the extraction, transport, liquefaction, and re-gasification of LNG can
be almost equal to the emissions produced from the actual burning of the gas,
effectively doubling the climate impact of each unit of energy created from gas
transported overseas).
6.
Texas RioGrande Legal Aid, Local Residents Sue Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission for Approving Fracked Gas Facility (Feb. 20, 2020),
https://perma.cc/UE6L-RVD3.
7.
Id.
8.
Miranda Wilson, Gas Projects Reveal FERC’s Environmental
Justice
Conundrum,
E&E NEWS ENERGYWIRE (Aug.
3,
2021),
https://perma.cc/5C6D-BX8C.
9.
NEXTDECADE, Community Opportunity: Rio Grande LNG,
https://perma.cc/72GY-B9LU (last visited Oct. 8, 2021); see also Texas LNG, Project
Overview, https://perma.cc/ALC5-GME3 (last visited Oct. 8, 2021).
10.
Department of Energy, Liquefied Natural Gas, OFFICE OF FOSSIL
ENERGY AND CARBON MANAGEMENT, https://perma.cc/E637-ESK6 (last visited Oct.
8, 2021).
11.
FERC,
Process
for
Natural
Gas
Certificates,
https://perma.cc/JQJ3-EQPW (last visited Sept. 10, 2021) (FERC issues a Certificate
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in the public interest because FERC’s EISs failed to take NEPA’s requisite
“hard look” at disparate impacts on EJCs, and because they did not
adequately explain why FERC rejected using a social cost of carbon
(“SCC”) tool to assess climate impacts. 12 In early 2020, FERC denied
Petitioners’ rehearing requests, arguing its EISs sufficiently addressed
Petitioners’ concerns.13 Petitioners then filed a petition for judicial review
in the D.C. Circuit. 14
III. POLITICAL BACKGROUND
The political background of environmental justice and climate change
issues are central to understanding how DOE and FERC integrate the
issues into decision-making processes and provides an essential backdrop
to the Court’s decision. This section will detail the political history and
modern standing of each issue to provide appropriate context for the
Court’s legal framework.
A. Growing Strength in Environmental Justice
Historically, pollution from oil, gas, and coal emissions has
disproportionately affected low-income African American communities in
the United States.15 More generally, industrial pollution has affected all
lower-income demographic groups more than middle and upper-class
groups.16 Climate change is expected to exacerbate the negative health
impacts of pollution and industrial development on lower-income
communities.17
Environmental justice advocates mobilized around racial
inequities in industrial siting and pollution during the Civil Rights Era of

Order as the final step in a sequence of events surrounding a project’s initial
application and subsequent public comment and environmental impact analyses).
12.
Vecinos para el Bienestar de la Comunidad Costera v. FERC, 6
F.4th 1321, 1327 (D.C. Cir. 2021).
13.
Id.
14.
Id.
15.
Ihab Mikati, Adam F. Benson, Jennifer Richmond-Bryant,
Disparities in Distribution of Particulate Matter Emission Sources by Race and
Poverty Status, AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PUBLIC HEALTH, Apr. 2018, at 480–485; see
also, Robert D. Bullard, Blacks and the Environment, HUMBOLDT JOURNAL OF SOCIAL
RELATIONS, 1987, at 165–84 (“[D]isadvantaged people are largely victims of middleand upper-class pollution because they usually live closest to the sources of
pollution—power plants, industrial installations, and in central cities where vehicle
traffic is heaviest . . .”).
16.
Bullard, supra note 17, at 165–84.
17.
Maxine Burkett, Just Solutions to Climate Change: A Climate
Justice Proposal for a Domestic Clean Development Mechanism, 56 BUFFALO L. REV.
169, 179 (2008) (citing reports that negative health impacts like pollution-related
respiratory illnesses will unevenly affect lower income and minority communities,
especially in areas with ozone levels that exceed National Ambient Air Quality
Standards).
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the 1960s. 18 In the 1980s and early 1990s, localized efforts to protect
lower-income communities and start rectifying environmental injustice
grew into policymaking at the federal level.19 In 1994, President Clinton
ordered that “each Federal agency shall make achieving environmental
justice part of its mission by identifying and addressing, as appropriate,
disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmental
effects of its programs, policies, and activities on minority populations and
low-income populations.” 20 The Order did not create a private right of
judicial review, thus it does not have the force of law.21
The Order did, however, direct the Clinton Administration to
establish an Interagency Working Group on Environmental Justice.22 In
consultation with the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) and
other agencies, the Council on Environmental Quality issued guidance in
1997 for agencies to follow in addressing environmental justice in the
NEPA process.23 The guidance recommends that to comply with NEPA,
agencies should assess the impact and consequences of their decisions on
environmental justice communities (“EJCs”). 24 Further, agencies are
required by NEPA to take a “hard look” at “ecological . . . economic,
social, [and] health” impacts of agency decisions.25
Critics argue Executive Order 12,898 has not adequately
addressed environmental justice issues because the Council on
Environmental Quality guidance lacks legal authority. Gridlock in
Congress continues to stymie efforts to incorporate environmental justice
guidance into law, so the executive branch controls progress on achieving

18.
EPA, Environmental Justice Timeline, https://perma.cc/FPS6DYB8 (last visited Sept. 23, 2021).
19.
Id.
20.
FEDERAL ACTIONS TO ADDRESS ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE IN
MINORITY POPULATIONS AND LOW-INCOME POPULATIONS, Exec. Order No. 12,898, §
1-101, 59 Fed. Reg. 7,629 (Feb. 11, 1994); see also EPA, Environmental Justice,
https://perma.cc/54LS-KHBS (last visited Oct. 9, 2021) (defining environmental
justice as the “fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all people regardless of
race, color, national origin, or income, with respect to the development,
implementation, and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations, and policies”).
21.
Id. § 6-609.
22.
Id. § 1-102.
23.
Executive Office of the President, Environmental Justice:
Guidance Under the National Environmental Policy Act, COUNCIL ON ENVTL.
QUALITY (Dec. 10, 1997), https://perma.cc/7MJ4-9GF8.
24.
EPA, Federal Interagency Working Group on Environmental
Justice (EJ IWG), ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE, https://perma.cc/SM2J-UW8W (last
updated Aug., 2021) (defining EJCs broadly as minority and low-income populations
that are susceptible to disproportionately high and adverse human health or
environmental effects of EPA programs); see also EPA, Climate Change and Social
Vulnerability in the United Stated: A Focus on Six Impacts, OFFICE OF ATMOSPHERIC
PROGRAMS (Sept. 21, 2021), https://perma.cc/HSC3-QJ37 (defining “low income”
individuals as those living in households with income that is 200-percent of the
poverty level or lower).
25.
40 C.F.R. § 1508.8 (2002).
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environmental justice. 26 Administration changes often reverse agency
priorities and undermine that progress.27 In January 2021, President Biden
re-prioritized the aims of Executive Order 12,898 by rescinding Trump
Era rulemakings, policies, and executive orders that sought to deregulate
industry at the cost of environmental justice and progressive climate
policy.28 President Biden’s Executive Order 14,008 catalogs ambitious
climate goals that re-prioritize the environmental justice and climate issues
under Council on Environmental Quality guidance.29
B. Vacillating Federal Climate Priorities
Improvements in environmental justice are inextricably bound to
the existential threat of climate change. 30 Climate disasters—drought,
hurricanes, floods, and wildfires—disproportionately impact communities
who have less mobility than middle- and upper-income communities do to
adapt to or recover from them. 31 Greenhouse gas emissions are the
principal cause of anthropogenic climate change. Behind China, the
United States is the second largest greenhouse gas emitter in the world.32
Legislative efforts to curb greenhouse gas emissions in the U.S.
and combat anthropogenic climate change have been railroaded by
gridlock in Congress, much like environmental justice legislation. 33
Notwithstanding its failures to pass climate legislation, the Obama
Administration Council on Environmental Quality and Interagency
26.
Environmental Justice: The Social and Demographic Impact of
Environmental Choice, 4 TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 9.1, 4(D)(iii)
(Matthew and Bender Co., 2021) (hereinafter “Environmental Justice”).
27.
See, e.g., Brie D. Sherwin, The Upside Down: A New Reality for
Science at the EPA and its Impact on Environmental Justice, 27 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J.
57, 74 (2019) (describing the change in regulatory priorities between the Obama and
Trump Administrations); see also Uma Outka, Elizabeth K. Warner, Reversing
Course on Environmental Justice Under the Trump Administration, 54 Wake Forest
L. Rev. 393, 413–14 (2019) (describing how the Trump Administration reversed
environmental justice priorities in ways that negatively impacted diverse
communities, such as the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe in relation to the Dakota Access
Pipeline).
28.
ENSURING THE FUTURE IS MADE IN ALL OF AMERICA BY ALL OF
AMERICA’S WORKERS, Exec. Order No. 14,005, 86 Fed. Reg. 17,7475 (Jan. 28, 2021).
29.
TACKLING THE CLIMATE CRISIS AT HOME AND ABROAD, Exec.
Order No. 14,008, 86 Fed. Reg. 19,7619 (Feb. 1, 2021); see Ellen M. Gilmer, Biden
Bolsters DOJ Focus on Environmental Justice, Climate, BLOOMBERG LAW (Jan. 27,
2021), https://perma.cc/UM6Z-MGQ2 (detailing the Biden Administration’s climate
goals).
30.
Climate Change and Social Vulnerability in the United States: A
Focus on Six Impacts, EPA, 430-R-21-003, 6 (Sept. 21, 2021),
https://perma.cc/4BVM-6CKH (key findings indicate that because Hispanic and
Latinx communities have high participation in weather-exposed industries, they are
particularly vulnerable to the effects of climate change).
31.
Id. at 9.
32.
Ian Tiseo, Global CO2 Emissions by Country 2009-2019,
STATISTA (Jan. 4, 2021), https://perma.cc/M7JC-HCS2.
33.
Environmental Justice, supra note 28, at 4(D)(iii).
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Working Group on SCC published technical guidance for agencies to
better assess the costs and benefits of regulations in the context of
greenhouse gas emissions and climate change. 34 The Council on
Environmental Quality guidance provides specific recommendations for
agencies to incorporate carbon pricing and discount rates into decisionmaking processes.
Notably, the Vecinos proceedings began during the Trump
Administration. 35 President Trump disbanded the Interagency Working
Group on SCC in March 2017, and his Office of Management and Budget
lowered Obama-era discount rates. 36 Along with environmental justice
issues, President Biden reprioritized SCC policies and restored Obama-era
Council on Environmental Quality guidance under Executive Order
13,990.37 Biden’s Office of Management and Budget reset discount rates
to Obama-era standards, and the Interagency Working Group on SCC has
reconvened (it is now called the Interagency Working Group on Social
Cost of Greenhouse Gases) to develop guidance that better reflects a fastevolving understanding of climate change.38
IV. LEGAL FRAMEWORK
To lay out the legal framework for the Vecinos decision, the D.C.
Circuit Court outlined the regulatory decision-making authority of the
Department of Energy (“DOE”) and FERC regarding environmental
justice and climate issues.
A. The Natural Gas Act of 1938
FERC and DOE share responsibility for regulating the domestic
transport and export of natural gas.39 DOE regulates the export of LNG,
and the Natural Gas Act requires FERC’s approval for the construction
and operation of gas pipelines.40 DOE delegated siting, construction, and
operations authority to FERC, meaning FERC is responsible for decision34.
Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of Carbon, Technical
Support Document: Social Cost of Carbon for Regulatory Impact Analysis Under
Executive Order 12866, 3, (Feb., 2010), https://perma.cc/3XLF-FZZS.
35.
FERC Orders, supra note 1.
36.
PROMOTING ENERGY INDEPENDENCE AND ECONOMIC GROWTH,
Exec. Order No. 13,653, 82 Fed. Reg. 16093, 16093-16097 (Mar. 31, 2017); see also
Dana Nuccitelli, The Trump EPA is Vastly Underestimating the Cost of Carbon
Dioxide Pollution to Society, New Research Finds, YALE CLIMATE CONNECTIONS
(July 30, 2020), https://perma.cc/Q6K6-5FFE.
37.
Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of Greenhouse Gases,
Technical Support Document: Social Cost of Carbon, Methane, and Nitrous Oxide:
Interim Estimates under Executive Order 13990, 5 (Feb. 2021),
https://perma.cc/NR7H-6PG3.
38.
Id.
39.
42 U.S.C § 7151(b) (2018); 15 U.S.C. § 717f(c) et seq.; see also
Pub. L. No. 95–91, 91 Stat. 565 (1977).
40.
15 U.S.C. § 717f (c)(1)(A).
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making surrounding the location and construction of pipelines and export
terminals.41
The Projects implicate FERC’s authority under the Natural Gas
42
Act. FERC must authorize the construction and operation of a proposed
LNG facility unless it determines that the facility will not be consistent
with the public interest. 43 Conversely, FERC may not authorize the
construction and operation of a proposed interstate LNG pipeline unless it
determines the pipeline is or will be required by the present or future public
convenience and necessity.44
To discern whether a project is in the “public convenience and
necessity,” FERC is required to consider conservation and environmental
issues, as well as impacts on gas consumers and the development of gas
supplies. 45 FERC’s “Certificate Policy Statement” further clarifies the
public convenience and necessity standard, providing that FERC will issue
a certificate if a project’s public benefits outweigh its adverse effects (i.e.
meeting unserved market demand versus deleterious environmental
impacts on surrounding communities).46 The certificate gives FERC legal
authority to exercise eminent domain in land acquisitions necessary for the
pipelines’ construction.47
B. NEPA
NEPA is the Nation’s “basic national charter for protection of the
environment,”48 and it requires that an EIS must be prepared if a decision
constitutes a major federal action that will significantly affect the quality
of the human environment.49 Under NEPA, a federal agency must take a
“hard look” at the potential impacts of its decision. 50 A “hard look”
requires considerations of alternatives, environmental impacts, and any
adverse environmental effects that cannot be avoided should the proposed
41
Delegation Order No. 00-004.00A, § 1.21.A, (Dept. Energy May
16, 2006), https://perma.cc/K8KG-F226 (May 16, 2006) (renewing delegation to
FERC over the construction and operation of LNG facilities); see also Vecinos para
el Bienestar de la Comunidad Costera v. FERC, 6 F.4th 1321, 1325 (D.C. Cir. 2021).
42.
15 U.S.C. § 717b; 15 U.S.C. § 717f.
43.
15 U.S.C. § 717b(a).
44.
Id.; see also Valerie L. Chartier-Hogancamp, Fairness and Justice:
Discrepancies in Eminent Domain for Oil and Natural Gas Pipelines, 49 TEX. ENVTL.
L.J. 67, 74 (2019).
45.
Minisink Residents for Envtl. Pres. & Safety v. FERC, 762 F.3d
97, 101 (D.C. Cir. 2014); see also Sierra Club v. FERC, 867 F.3d 1357, 1373 (D.C.
Cir. 2017).
46.
Certification of New Interstate Natural Gas Pipeline Facilities, 88
FERC ¶ 61, 227 (1999); clarified, 90 FERC ¶ 61, 128 (2000); further clarified, 92
FERC ¶ 61, 094 (2000); see also City of Oberlin, Ohio v. FERC, 937 F.3d 599, 602
(D.C. Cir. 2019).
47.
15 U.S.C. § 717f(h).
48.
Ctr. For Biological Diversity v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety
Admin., 538 F.3d 1172, 1185 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(a)).
49.
42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2018).
50.
Ctr. For Biological Diversity, 538 F.3d at 1194.
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action take effect. 51 Agencies must also consider foreseeable indirect
effects, connected actions, similar actions, and account for the cumulative
effects of any incremental impacts, added to other past, present, and
reasonably foreseeable future actions. 52
C. The Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”)
Courts review NEPA decisions against the APA “arbitrary or
capricious” standard.53 In reviewing an agency decision, the Court “will
not ‘flyspeck’ an agency’s environmental analysis, looking for any
deficiency no matter how minor.”54 Instead, the Court looks to determine
whether an agency gave the matter the requisite “hard look” under NEPA,
ensuring the agency adequately considered the environmental impacts of
its actions and its decision is not arbitrary or capricious.55 The Court gives
deference to the agency when evaluating data within the agency's technical
expertise.56
V. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT COURT RULING
The Court remanded FERC’s approval orders for three reasons.
First, the EJCs FERC identified did not adequately encompass the region
that would be impacted by ozone emissions. 57 Second, FERC failed to
respond to Petitioners’ complaint that FERC was required to use an SCC
tool but refused to. 58 Finally, the Court found that FERC erroneously
awarded Rio Bravo a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity
because of its failure to satisfy NEPA, ruling that a “hard look” is
necessary to reasonably balance a project’s economic benefits with its
negative impacts and establish public interest.59
The Court remanded without vacatur because it expected FERC
could remedy deficiencies in its EIS on remand without causing
inequitable delay to the project development.
A. Did Census Blocks Adequately Represent Potentially Affected EJCs?
FERC projected the impact of the Projects on EJCs by quantifying
the amount of air pollution that would affect individuals within two-mile

51.
Id.
52.
40 C.F.R. § 1508.8(b); see also Delaware Riverkeeper Network v.
FERC, 753 F.3d 1304, 1309 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (citing 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25).
53.
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2018).
54.
Nevada v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 457 F.3d 78, 93 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
55.
Nat’l Comm. for the New River v. FERC, 373 F.3d 1323, 1327
(D.C. Cir. 2004).
56.
Id.
57.
Vecinos para el Bienestar de la Comunidad Costera v. FERC, 6
F.4th 1321, 1330 (D.C. Cir. 2021).
58.
Id. at 1329.
59.
Id. at 1331.
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radius census blocks surrounding the project area.60 The Court held that
FERC's EIS did not adequately explain why a two-mile range adequately
represented potential EJC health impacts when the EISs acknowledged air
pollution had the potential to reach a distance as far as thirty-one miles
away. 61 FERC was required under NEPA to provide a reasonable and
adequate explanation for its decision to delineate the area potentially
affected by the project by making a “rational connection between the facts
found and the decision made.” 62 The Court stipulated that on remand,
FERC must provide that explanation and further explain whether its
conclusions still comport with its position that the projects would not
disproportionately and adversely affect minority and low-income
residents.63
B. Should Climate Impacts have been Analyzed?
FERC estimated the amount of greenhouse gas emissions
associated with the construction and operation of the Projects.64 However,
it concluded it could not determine the significance of the Projects’ impact
on climate change because there is not a universally accepted method for
doing so. 65 The Court ruled that if FERC cannot obtain information
relevant to reasonably foreseeable significant adverse impacts, like
impacts surrounding climate change, under 40 C.F.R. § 1502.21(c) it must
include an evaluation of the impacts based upon theoretical approaches or
methods generally accepted in the science community. 66 Petitioners
alleged FERC did not include any such evaluation within its EISs. The
Court held that, regardless of FERC’s statutory obligation to analyze the
climate impacts of the Projects, under 40 C.F.R. § 1502.21(c), it was
incumbent on FERC to respond to a central statutory question raised by
Petitioners.67 The Court held that because FERC raised the issue of climate
change in its EIS, but failed to respond to Petitioners’ complaints, its EIS
was deficient.68 The Court ordered that on remand, FERC must explain
whether the statute calls for it to apply an SCC tool or some other generally
accepted protocol, and if not, to provide a reasonable explanation for its
decision.69
C. Is the Rio Bravo Pipeline in the Public Interest?

60.
Br. Resp’t FERC 41.
61.
Vecinos, 6 F.4th at 1330 (D.C. Cir. 2021).
62.
Id. (citing Cmtys. Against Runway Expansion, Inc. v. F.A.A., 355
F.3d at 689 (D.C. Cir. 2004)). Don’t abbrev FAA
63.
Id. at 20.
64.
Br. Resp’t FERC 69.
65.
Vecinos, 6 F.4th at 1328.
66.
40 C.F.R. § 1502.21(c) (2012).
67.
Vecinos, 6 F.4th at 1329.
68.
Id.
69.
Id. at 1330.
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The Court held that FERC’s failure to adequately explain its use of twomile radius census blocks indicates its Natural Gas Act public interest
analysis was deficient. 70 During “exceedance events,” ambient air quality
impact might reach 76.5 parts per billion (“ppb”), exceeding the 70 ppb
National Ambient Air Quality Standard (“NAAQS”). 71 Further, ozone
pollution has the potential to reach a distance as far as thirty-one miles
away.72 FERCs public interest analysis was not grounded in a “rational
connection between the facts found and the decision made.”73 If pollution
has the potential to impact individuals thirty-one miles away, FERC had
an obligation to adequately explain why two-mile radius census blocks are
an appropriate representation of impacted EJCs.74 The Court ordered that
on remand, FERC must address whether its conclusion that the projects
are in the public interest still holds, or otherwise reasonably explain why
it is not obligated to consider them.75
VI. ANALYSIS
Although the Vecinos Court ruled only on procedural NEPA
violations, the substantive disagreements between FERC and Petitioners
highlight the transformation that took place during the Trump Era in
relation to environmental justice and climate policy. Further, the
arguments offer insight into policy issues that are likely to be addressed
under the Biden Administration, which has already demonstrated its
commitment to doing.
A. FERC’s Flexible Rules for Determining Impacts on EJCs
During NEPA review, environmental justice guidelines
recommend that agencies take a “hard look” at the impacts its projects
have on low-income and minority communities.76 Practically, the agencies
may choose to use land areas of any size to define EJCs nearby a project
if it provides a reasonable explanation for doing so.
FERC argued the Projects would not disproportionately affect
EJCs on three bases. First, FERC maintained that because the EJC it
identified in two-mile radius census blocks has a similar composition to
the rest of South Texas, the census blocks represented the entire region
that could be affected by air quality pollution.77 Second, it suggested its air
quality analysis projects a worst-case scenario, therefore normal
70.
Id.
71.
Br. Resp’t FERC 61.
72.
Vecinos, 6 F.4th at 1330.
73.
Id.
74.
Id.
75.
Id. at 1331.
76.
Executive Office of the President, Environmental Justice:
Guidance Under the National Environmental Policy Act, COUNCIL ON ENVTL.
QUALITY (Dec. 10, 1997), https://perma.cc/7MJ4-9GF8.
77.
Br. Resp’t FERC 56.
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operations would not have disparate effects on the health of the EJCs it
identified in the project area.78 Finally, it argued that the local economic
benefits outweigh potential negative impacts on the local tourism, fishing
economies, and property values.79
FERC determined the projects would not disproportionately affect
EJCs because its air quality projections were conservative and reflected
the worst-case scenario. 80 During “exceedance events,” ambient air
quality impact might reach 76.5 parts per billion (“ppb”), exceeding the
70 ppb National Ambient Air Quality Standard (“NAAQS”). The
exceedance event calculations assumed operation of the facilities at full
capacity.81 FERC argued the facilities would ordinarily operate at a low
enough capacity such that ambient air quality would not surpass the
Standard,82 and thus concluded that the NAAQS was a “reasonable proxy
for the potential health impacts, including the environmental justice
community.”83
FERC also looked at whether the demographic features of
different communities surrounding the projects make them particularly
susceptible to respiratory disease.84 However, Petitioners noted that FERC
only addressed the question of whether certain races or ethnic groups
would be more susceptible than others, neglecting to consider factors such
as age and lack of healthcare access. FERC failed to explain why the
NAAQS are the appropriate metric for determining impacts on EJCs
without consideration of those additional factors.85 Further, FERC did not
adequately explain options to mitigate the negative health effects from air
emissions, such as measures that might reduce air emissions from shipping
vessels responsible for liquid natural gas exports. 86
Finally, Petitioners argued that FERC did not adequately explain
potential non-greenhouse gas effects in its conclusion that positive effects
on the labor market outweighed negative impacts on property values, the
fishing industry, and the tourism economy. In its EISs, FERC found the
“cumulative impacts on property values by the three Brownsville projects
were not reasonably foreseeable and therefore appropriately omitted from
the environmental review,” and the projects would “not be expected to
affect regional tourism patterns or the overall level of visitation to the
region.”87 FERC did not indicate how it reached that conclusion, nor the
methods it used to conduct its cost-benefit analysis.88
78.
Br. Resp’t FERC 35-36.
79.
Br. Resp’t FERC 43.
80.
Br. Resp’t FERC 35.
81.
Br. Resp’t FERC 61.
82.
Br. Resp’t FERC 61.
83.
Br. Resp’t FERC 61.
84.
Br. Resp’t FERC 64.
85.
Pet’r’s Final J. Reply Br. at 23, Vecinos para el Bienestar de la
Comunidad Costera v. FERC, 6 F.4th 1321 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (Nos. 20-1093–94
(consolidated)).
86.
Pet’r’s Final J. Reply Br. 29.
87.
Br. Resp’t FERC 46.
88.
Pet’r’s Final J. Reply Br. 51.
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Notwithstanding the substantive disagreements surrounding
impacts to EJCs, the Court ruled only on the narrow scope of FERC’s use
of census blocks to describe the Projects’ potential impacts on EJCs. The
geographic scope of environmental justice analyses is often a sticking
point during NEPA review. Agencies may manipulate the scale of land
areas used to describe EJCs if they provide a reasonable explanation for
doing so.
The juxtaposition between Vecinos and a similar decision from
this Court demonstrates exactly how agencies can manipulate their
analyses to favor particular outcomes. 89 In Sierra Club, the petitioners
claimed that proposed natural gas pipeline projects would
disproportionately affect low-income and minority groups in Alabama,
Georgia, and Florida.90 The Court found FERC had done its due diligence
by analyzing similar potential health impacts on surrounding
communities.91 Further, FERC had reasonably compared alternate routes
with its preferred route and concluded any alternative would pose similar
impacts on lower-income and minority communities.92
Notably, FERC used census tracts to describe EJCs in Sierra
Club, rather than their smaller subunit, the census block.93 In Sierra Club,
describing EJCs with census tracts was more suitable for advancing the
Sabal Trail Pipeline because the census tracts encompassed distant, more
affluent neighborhoods. The census tracts effectively buried pocket
minority communities in a broader dataset, even though those groups tend
to live much closer to compressors and other harmful gas infrastructure.94
By contrast, in Vecinos, FERC used much smaller, two-mile census blocks
to describe EJCs even though their own data showed a potential for
broader regional health impacts. Census blocks were better suited to
Developers’ goals because they improved the Projects’ optics by
diminishing the public perception of harm.
As FERC indicated, the demographic composition throughout the
rest of South Texas is much like Brownsville. 95 If FERC broadens the
scope of its environmental justice analysis on remand, it will likely find
representative census tracts have a similar composition as the two-mile
radius census blocks.96 Denial of permit vacatur is essentially an invitation
from the Court to provide the few changes necessary to satisfy the

89.
Sierra Club v. FERC, 867 F.3d 1357, 1369 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
90.
Id.
91.
Id.
92.
Id.
93.
Sierra Club, 867 F.3d at 1370.
94.
Sean Sullivan, ‘Environmental Justice’ at Center of Suit Against
FERC’s Sabal Trail Approval, S&P GLOBAL MARKET INTELLIGENCE (Apr. 20, 2017),
https://perma.cc/39Y9-TVYG.
95.
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Id.
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“arbitrary and capricious” standard and advance the projects, much like
the outcome of Sierra Club.97
President Clinton’s Executive Order 12,898 did not create a
private right to judicial review. 98 Further, NEPA does not require that
agencies provide more than a “reasonable explanation” for permitting
projects with a potentially disproportionate impact on EJCs. 99 The
interplay of NEPA and the APA only requires an agency to provide an
explanation that is neither arbitrary nor capricious.100 The outcome of the
Vecinos decision likely rings hollow with critics of Executive Order
12,898 because it does not provide a new footing for EJC challenges, and
instead demonstrates how an agency can manipulate environmental justice
analyses to better suit the interests of developers.
B. Trouble with Monetizing Carbon
The courts have consistently recognized that NEPA does not
require the use of an SCC tool, nor does it require a cost-benefit analysis
that incorporates greenhouse gas emissions.101 In Vecinos, FERC argued
NEPA does not provide a substantive requirement to monetize the
projects’ social costs of carbon, and for policy reasons, it chose not to do
so. 102 FERC offered three primary points to support its argument that
monetizing the SCC would not “meaningfully inform its project-level
NEPA review”:
(1) EPA states that 'no consensus exists on the
appropriate [discount] rate to use for analyses spanning
multiple generations' and, consequently, significant
variation in output can result';
(2) 'the tool does not measure the actual incremental
impacts of a project on the environment'; and
(3) 'there are no established criteria identifying the
monetized values that are to be considered significant for
NEPA reviews.103
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(Feb.
6,
2018),
https://perma.cc/manage/create?folder=135257; see also Maya Weber, Sabal Trail,
Hillabee projects get two more years from US FERC to complete work, S & P GLOBAL
(Jun. 16, 2021), https://perma.cc/EEC7-HM7T.
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MINORITY POPULATIONS AND LOW-INCOME POPULATIONS, Exec. Order No. 12,898 §
6-609, 59 Fed. Reg. 7,629 (Feb. 11, 1994).
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Ctr. For Biological Diversity v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety
Admin., 538 F.3d 1172, 1194 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing C.F.R. § 1500.1(a)).
100.
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(D.C. Cir. 2004).
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F. Supp. 3d 1223, 1241 (D. Colo. 2019).
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103.
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FERC additionally argued that the SCC tool “no longer represents
government policy” because the tool was “withdrawn as no longer
representative of governmental policy” by President Trump with
Executive Order 13,783 in 2017.104
FERC circumnavigated an adequate and reasonable explanation
for the carbon costs of the project with a strawman, arguing that if it had
monetized the costs of greenhouse gases, then it would have had to
monetize the social benefits of the proposed project to appropriately
balance the SCC tool’s projected costs.105 Petitioners note that FERC did
monetize many of those costs, at least to the extent needed to write them
off. For example, FERC explained the shipping from the projects would
not have a significant impact on local tourism and commercial fishing
economies.106
FERC premised its SCC argument on the assertion that there is no
consensus surrounding an appropriate discount to be applied.107 FERC was
correct that 40 C.F.R. § 1502.23 establishes the merits and drawbacks of
proposed projects do not need to be reflected monetarily when there are
important qualitative considerations to consider. 108 Although there is
neither a statutory obligation nor a consensus as to the appropriate method
for monetizing carbon, the use of either a 3-percent rate or below is
generally accepted in the scientific community.109 Petitioners’ rehearing
request pointed out that where an agency finds guidance lacking around a
particular impact, “agencies must use generally accepted methods to
analyze impacts even where those methods are imperfect or cannot
provide the exact information the agency would prefer.”110 Further, they
indicated that FERC previously found the use of an SCC tool is generally
accepted within the regulatory community. 111 Because FERC estimated
the greenhouse gases associated with the projects but did not adequately
explain why they excluded an SCC analysis, it was incumbent on them to
address the Petitioners’ challenge under 40 C.F.R. § 1502.21(c).112
Petitioners did not persuade the Court on the merits of their
substantive climate claims. Rather, they persuaded the Court because of
procedural deficiencies in FERC’s briefing and rehearing denials. FERC
neglected to adhere to its statutory obligation to respond to Petitioners’
104.
Br. Resp’t FERC 75.
105.
Br. Resp’t FERC 59-60.
106.
Br. Resp’t FERC 43.
107.
Br. Resp’t FERC 73.
108.
Br. Resp’t FERC 64.
109.
See, e.g., Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of
Greenhouse Gases, Technical Support Document: Social Cost of Carbon, Methane,
and Nitrous Oxide: Interim Estimates under Executive Order 13990, 20 (Feb. 2021),
https://perma.cc/3LJD-FXHU (survey of over 200 experts found three-quarters agreed
the median risk-free social discount rate of 2 percent was acceptable) (citation
omitted).
110.
Pet’r’s Final J. Reply Br. 37.
111.
Pet’r’s Final J. Reply Br. 44.
112.
Vecinos para el Bienestar de la Comunidad Costera v. FERC, 6
F.4th 1321, 1329 (D.C. Cir. 2021).
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claims under 40 C.F.R. § 1502.21(c), and the Court provided it with the
opportunity to fix that error on remand.113 The Court’s order only requires
FERC to address deficiencies in the EISs at a project-level. Therefore,
FERC may either apply an appropriate discount rate, or provide a more
thorough explanation for why a generally accepted method is unworkable,
which may well be the case given other, less predictable externalities like
global market trends.
The Brownsville Projects are among dozens of other large-scale
natural gas developments proposed, or in development, across the
country. 114 FERC approved ten other natural gas projects within nine
months of approving the Projects here.115 Recently, the EPA urged FERC
to adopt an SCC tool in response to the surge of gas approvals flooding
the wake of retired coal-fired power plants and new gaps in the energy
marketplace.116 For example, Columbia Gulf Transmission has proposed
facilities in Louisiana that the EPA says would cause over $205 million
dollars in climate damages per year. 117 Similarly, an Iroquois Gas
Transmission project could do more than $144 million in annual
damage.118
Disagreement surrounding the efficacy of traditional SCC tools to
combat climate change is multi-faceted. Some environmental advocates
have criticized the Interagency Working Group’s estimations for being too
conservative, despite generally acknowledging they are a step in the right
direction.119 On the other hand, other critics argue that the models reflect
values and political judgments at the cost of statistical relevance and
accuracy, because they fail to account for externalities other than
greenhouse gas emissions.120
FERC has not indicated precisely how it will respond to EPAs
recommendations regarding an SCC tool in those projects, nor whether the
113.
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114.
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recommendations will inform decision-making generally. In a March 18,
2021, decision, FERC considered the significance of a proposed natural
gas pipeline project’s greenhouse gas emissions and their contribution to
climate change for the first time. 121 That decision indicates FERC is
beginning to approach climate change challenges head-on—at least
providing an explanation for conclusions surrounding emissions, whether
it changes the course of the decision or not.
D. A Strategy Change under New Leadership?
Public interest balancing tends to weigh in favor of substantial
economic benefits, but FERC’s approach to factoring environmental
justice and climate issues into its cost-benefit analyses may be evolving.
FERC manipulated the land area used to describe EJCs in both
Sierra Club and Vecinos. Although the legal outcomes were different, the
strategy was consistent with the Trump Administration’s emphasis on
narrowing the scope of significant and cumulative effects analyses during
NEPA review.122 So, too, was FERC’s decision not to use an SCC tool for
lack of consensus and changes in administrative priorities. 123 President
Trump was a staunch advocate for rolling-back, or “streamlining,” NEPA
review to expedite economic development.124
When FERC approved the Projects, Richard Glick was the sole
Democrat and dissenting opinion against the approval orders. 125 Glick
identified the same deficiencies with the projects as Petitioners: the
environmental justice, greenhouse gas emissions, and public interest
analyses were either inadequate or too narrow in scope to satisfy NEPA
and the Natural Gas Act.126 Glick is now the agency head at FERC, and
has prioritized incorporating the risks of environmental harm due to
climate change in agency decision making. The Biden Administration and
Chairman Glick’s renewed emphasis on environmental justice and climate
is yet to transform project-level siting and decision making around LNG
infrastructure. Nevertheless, Chairman Glick recently indicated FERC is
committed to reviewing environmental justice and climate issues on a
case-by-case basis.127 Further, he emphasized his priority at FERC is to
mitigate the legal risk to developers and the federal government, couching
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“risk” as the upstream and downstream economic and environmental
impacts of climate change.128
VII. CONCLUSION
The Vecinos decision is unlikely to fundamentally change the
course of environmental justice and SCC jurisprudence under NEPA.
The Court did not rule on the merits of Petitioners’ substantive claims,
recognizing its role in determining the outcome of NEPA claims is
merely to establish whether FERC’s EISs were procedurally sufficient.
As the Court discussed, FERC will likely address deficiencies in
its EISs to the extent required by NEPA. To vacate FERC’s Orders could
have spelled delay and inequitable harm to Intervenors. If FERC cannot
remedy deficiencies in its EISs, Petitioners may again look to NEPA to
show the Projects pose glaring environmental justice and climate issues
that cannot be explained away by taking a “harder look.” Even then,
advocates have had only marginal success enjoining agency decisions on
environmental justice claims before.129 They have had even less success
enforcing implementation of SCC tools through Court orders.130
The proceedings have not delayed the development of the
Brownsville Projects, thus it is even less likely that any future decisions
will stop them. Similar litigation surrounding natural gas development,
like Sierra Club, has played out in favor of economic development, not
environmental justice or climate issues. Along with other project
proposals on FERC’s docket, Vecinos has helped to raise the profile of
environmental justice and climate issues before agency heads and
policymakers.131 FERC is not bound to the policies of other
administrative agencies. However, prodding from the EPA and recent
FERC decisions suggest changes to climate policies at FERC may
continue to unfold as part of President Biden’s promised climate agenda.
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LNG production is unlikely to decrease in the foreseeable future
because it is widely viewed as carbon neutral.132 As such, LNG helps
countries satisfy energy demand and meet clean energy goals as they
divest from traditional fossil fuels.133 Shortages across the globe further
indicate a substantial market opportunity for the United States.134 No
matter how progressive an Administration’s views on environmental
justice and climate, public interest balancing weighs the overall
economic benefits of a project. The Developers will likely provide jobs
and stimulate the local economy, and they will likely negatively impact
nearby EJCs. Notwithstanding local impacts, the global market envisions
LNG helping to achieve carbon emissions goals by divesting from
traditional, dirtier fuel sources like coal. The demand for LNG is
growing rapidly both domestically and abroad, and the United States has
the potential to capitalize on gaps in the market.
Tension at the Federal level between economic development and
a need to curb carbon emissions indicates that industrial development
(i.e., in LNG markets) is likely to continue disproportionately impacting
lower-income and minority communities at an appreciable scale.135 Like
the agency policies in place as this proceeding began, agency rules are
only as strong as the statutes behind them. While Congress delays on
passing climate legislation surrounding environmental justice and the
SCC, decision-making at FERC and other agencies remains subject to
the political priorities.
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